Abstract
Introduction
Passive testing is a process of detecting faults in a system under test by passively observing its input/output behaviors only without interrupting its normal operations. It collects input/output information from the "in-process" system without disturbing the normal network operations by applying active testing messages.
Passive testing is useful for network fault management. As a tester collects input/output messages from an implementation under test it checks if the message sequence conforms to the specification. In [4] , the authors reviewed the concept of passive testing and developed algorithms for finite state machine (FSM) and nondeterministic finite state machine (NFSM) models. In [6] [7] , the authors specified the network as a communicating finite state machine (CFSM) where fault detection and location were studied. Passive testing is a feasible approach for distributed systems such as routing protocols [11] while active testing is not always feasible, since it is difficult to interrupt a router in operation.
The published works on passive testing are on control portion testing, yet little effort has been devoted to the data portion testing. Specifically, a protocol data portion contains variables to encode states, which can be modeled as an Extended Finite State Machine(EFSM). In [10] a simple algorithm on EFSM was developed and applied to the GSM-MAP protocol, and the test coverage of passive testing was demonstrated. The algorithm records the values of variables, and discards them whenever ambiguity occurs. Yet no convincing arguments were given concerning how the faults were detected.
In this paper, we passively test the variable values of protocols and propose an efficient algorithm to trace the variable values as well as the system state. Variables are critical in some protocols since they can determine the external behavior of the system. On the other hand, it is known to be difficult to test variable values [5] . Our algorithms can deal with all kinds of operations on variable values associated with transitions and provide efficient variable value determination for the data portion fault detection.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, an Event-driven EFSM model is presented where the predicates and actions are defined in BNF form. A simple algorithm is introduced in Section 3.1, and then modifications are discussed with examples. A more powerful algorithm is proposed in Section 3.2 and illustrated in Section 3.3. Fault detection capabilities of passive testing algorithms are also discussed. In Section 4, a model of the OSPF neighbor state machine is described and the experimental results with different algorithms are reported. We conclude our paper in Section 5.
A Model
Network protocols contain variables. Although an FSM can usually represent the control portion of a communication protocol, it is not powerful enough to properly model the data portion, the variables associated with a protocol system. We introduce an Event-driven Extended Finite State Machine model to express the data portion so as to effectively determine how the variables affect state transitions and how they are modified during transitions. In passive testing, only observable behavior of the network devices can be captured. Each packet/message from one peer to its counterpart is called an event. An event is either an input message to the device under test or an output message from it, but not both. The fields in the message are taken as parameters of this event. The predicate of a transition is a logic (Boolean) expression. It is composed of a set of variables, denoted by a vector Ü ´Ü ½ Ü µ, and the parameters of the current event.
In active testing, the tester sends a message to the implementation under test (IUT), and then waits for a response. The messages exchanged between the tester and IUT can be viewed as a sequence of stimulus/response pairs: ½ Ó ½ ¾ Ó ¾ ¿ Ó ¿ . But in passive testing, all the packets are captured individually by the tester from the network without any knowledge of the causal relations between the packets. Therefore, we use an Event-driven EFSM to model the protocol system under test. In this model, we handle one event at each time, either an input event or an output event. If the original protocol specification has a transition like × ½ Ó × ¾ , we will convert it into 
Passive Testing Algorithms
In [4] the passive testing process contains two phases. The first phase is to identify the current state, which is called passive homing. The second is the fault detection phase where all the events are traced to find a difference between the specification and the implementation. When we turn to the EEFSM model, the homing phase has to find the values for the variables as well as the current state. We use the term "state homing" when the current state is identified. Whereas "variable homing" means all the variable values are determined by the tester. According to the EEFSM model, variable values are set in Actions. In passive testing, the network is in operation when the passive testing process starts. There is no guarantee that "state homing" or "variable homing" can be achieved. In this work, we combine the two phases, since the homing phase and the fault-detection phase use the same procedure. We introduce two passive testing algorithms with the EEFSM model. Algorithm 1 is simple and similar to the one in [10] . After discussing its deficiencies, we present Algorithm 2, which is much more efficient in detecting faults. And we also give a criteria to evaluate the fault detection capability of different passive testing algorithms.
Algorithm 1
A straightforward approach is to record and then keep track of a variable value when it is known. We use unknown when its value has not been determined by the tester yet. The current status of a machine is denoted as:
The current possible state set: Ë ¯The current possible variable value vector : Ü. In this algorithm, the predicate of a transition must be evaluated to guard the transition. Since there may be variables with unknown value in the predicate, there may be three possible results of the evaluation.
1. TRUE. The logic expression is evaluated to be true. If a transition is possible, the end state of this transition is added to the next possible state set. Along with the variable assignments, we obtain the next possible system status after the current event. In what follows we analyze these deficiencies with some examples.

Algorithm 1 does not use the implicit information in
the predicates. The predicates are only used to guard the executability of the transitions. In fact, useful information can be obtained from predicates. Consider the example in Fig. 1 . Using Algorithm 1, the value of Ù remains unknown after the transition fires. However, this is the only possible transition from S1. We know that Ù ½ after this transition. We call the constraints in the predicates the "implicit" information, which could be very useful for passive homing as well as fault detection. With the initial state S1 and Ù unknown, after input event ´¿µ occurs, Algorithm 1 takes that the transition from S2 to S3 is also possible. Actually after ´¿µ occurs, Ù ¿ must be satisfied. If we keep this information, then the transition with event from S2 to S3 cannot be executed because the predicate evaluates to be FALSE. So there should not be an input event ´¿µ followed immediately by an output event .
If an implementation contains such a fault, it will go undetected by Algorithm 1. 
Algorithm 2
Considering all these and other deficiencies of Algorithm 1, we present Algorithm 2, which is much more effective for fault detection and yet more complex.
1. Use the Interval formalism [8] In Algorithm 2 we use two CCS queues Q1, Q2, where Q1 records the current possible CCS set and Q2 records the next possible CCS set. Upon an event , we find out all the eligible CCS in Q1 to fire transitions. The next transition to fire from each CCS must be consistent with those constraints in the current CCS. That is, before we could declare that a transition is executable, the predicate of this transition has to be checked to assure that it is consistent with the Ê´ Üµ and ×× ÖØ´ Üµ of the current CCS. If a transition passes the consistency check, a successor CCS is generated.
There may be multiple CCSs at a moment before hom- 
Consistency Check and Interval Refinement
The purpose of the check consistency procedure is to refine the interval of each variable in addition to the satisfiability checking. If the interval of some variable becomes empty, the execution sequence to this point must contain a transition whose predicate was FALSE(yet with the value POSSIBLE during the execution), and we know that there exists inconsistency among the constraints, and the current configuration is not possible.
Before we delve into the details of consistency check, we first introduce two concepts: normalized simple predicate and Interval refinement.
To find inconsistency between Ø.predicate and Ø ×× ÖØ´ Üµ, we first need to transform their conjunction to DNF form. Each conjunctive term in this DNF is a simple predicate or simple predicates connected by " " operator. Each simple predicate can be transformed into a normalized form as follows. 
Definition 4 (Normalized Simple Predicate) A normalized simple predicate is in the form of
½ Ü ½ · ¾ Ü ¾ · · Ü ,
return flag end
In Proc1, conjunctive terms are processed separately (line 3) and the results are combined together (line 11). For each conjunctive term, every simple predicate is checked and the intervals of variables are refined iteratively. Whenever an interval changes its value, Proc1 goes back to line 5. The stopping criterion is: no variable changes its interval. Since each iteration reduces the interval strictly monotonically and the interval boundaries are integers, the iteration stops in finitely many steps.
A flag is used in Proc1 to indicate that at least one of the conjunctive terms is satisfied. If the value of this flag is false after the loop, it means the entire conjunctive terms are The check consistency procedure gives a general method to refine the intervals of variables. Heuristic procedures can be used to simplify the calculation. For example, at the beginning of processing a conjunctive term, we can pick those equations in the form of "Ü ÓÒ×Ø ÒØ" and use the constant value to replace x in the conjunctive term. Such methods can help to reduce the number of iterations.
The computation time of this procedure depends on the number of the conjunctive terms and the interval of variables. In the worst case, the number of iterations equals the length of the variable's interval, È Ê´Ü µ where Ê´Ü µ denotes the length of Ü 's interval. In most protocol specifications, the predicates are quite simple. We have analyzed some protocol specifications, such as OSPF, TCP, PPP and BGP, the check consistency procedure can usually be completed in no more than 3 iterations.
Executing Actions
If a transition is executed, the variables may be modified by the assignments in the action. In passive testing, to trace the variable values we follow the assignments in the specification. Proc2 contains a procedure for executing the assignments.
Assignments can be classified into three types. We 
Fault Detection Capability of Passive Testing Algorithms
In active testing for protocol control portions, the faults are generally divided into output faults and next-state faults. In passive testing of protocol data portions with Event-driven EFSM, we classify faults into control-message faults and event-parameter faults. If a current event cannot be executed from the current state, it is a control-message fault. If the event can be fired while its parameters are inconsistent with the variable values, we call it an event-parameter fault. Because the initial configuration of a machine is unknown when passive testing begins, not all the faults can be detected by passive testing. A passive testing algorithm is correct if it does not report nonexistent faults. A passive testing algorithm is complete if for any execution sequence such that the specification and the IUT produce observable different event sequences, the algorithm can detect the faults. It can be shown that the completeness of passive testing is undecidable [3] . A good passive testing algorithm must be correct and should be powerful enough, if not complete. "Homing" is a critical criteria to evaluate the power of different passive testing algorithms. If an algorithm can identify the current configuration of IUT, it can trace not only the state but also the precise variables values, which means more possibility to detect faults.
Algorithm 2 could detect both control-message faults and data-portion faults. Algorithm 2 is correct because it would not report a fault when there is none. Algorithm 2 preserves all the possible current configurations in each step. So if the implementation is correct, its configuration should be contained in one of the configuration sets built by Algorithm 2.
An example
In this section, we use an example EEFSM shown in Figure 5 to illustrate the execution of Algorithm 2. In this example EEFSM, each state will ignore any unspecified input and stay unchanged. The following table illustrates the execution of Algorithm 2 (including Proc1 and Proc2) step by step upon the observed event sequence ´ µ ´½½µ ´ µ ´½½µ. Initially, there are 7 CCSs. Each CCS corresponds to a state in the EEFSM and has an empty set of asserts. The initial interval of each variable is set according to its declaration and denoted by '-' in the table.
According to Algorithm 2, from the initial set of CCSs, upon input event ´ µ, CCS S1,-, , S4,-, , S5,-, , S6,-, , S7,-, will generate the same successor S1,-, , while CCS S2,-, will remain unchanged. CCS S3,-, will generate the following two successor CCSs, S4, R(u)= Figure 5 . An Example EEFSM Table 2 . Consistency check and interval refinement
Now we show in detail how the successor CCS S5, R(u)= [5, 7] , R(v)= [4, 6] Table 2 shows how Proc1 check the consistency of the assertion and refine the intervals of variables Ù and Ú. We can see from Table 2 , after 2 iterations, the intervals of variables Ù and Ú stay unchanged and the refinement is finished. Upon completion, no inconsistency is found and the variables are refined to R(u)= [5, 7] , R(v)= [4, 6] , R(seq)=11, R(up)=19 . The end state of the transition T8 is S5, which results in the successor CCS S5, R(u)= [5, 7] , R(v)= [4, 6] , R(seq)=11, R(up)=19 , u v & 11=u+v in step 2.
Experimental Results
OSPF [9] is a widely used routing protocol in the Internet based on the Open Short Path First algorithm. The OSPF neighbor state machine is to maintain connections between two OSPF neighboring routers and exchange Link State Advertisements (LSA). Variables, such as sequence numbers, are used to record the current status of the connections.
Formally, an EEFSM can be transformed into an NFSM by extracting the variables from the specification. Thus the NFSM has no predicates, no actions and no input parameters. The OSPF NFSM model is presented in Appendix C. This NFSM model is like a mesh, revealing little information about the neighbor state machine. Note that the transformed NFSM is not equivalent to the original EEFSM.
We implemented three passive testing algorithms to compare their fault detection capabilities. They are the Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 presented in this paper and the NFSM algorithm presented in [4] . We applied these algorithms in the OSPF neighbor state machine testing.
The experiments are carried out in an experimental environment as shown in Fig 6. In the experimental network, we used Socrates [2] 
Figure 6. Experiment environment
Routers are high-speed devices. In order to capture all the OSPF packets in a conversation, we developed an OSPF Watcher to record all the related packets in a database. The IP filter and the Decoder analyze these captured OSPF packets and send useful event messages to the Tester. This test architecture can work in a real network and detect faults online while the RUT is connected in a network in operation.
We use the capability of state homing and variable homing to denote the efficiency of the passive testing algorithms. With the NFSM model, state homing is not obtained in all the 25 cases. There are 8 cases out of the 25 experiments that Algorithm 1 completed the homing phase, and 14 cases out of 25 that Algorithm 2 completed the homing phase. The experimental results are shown in Table 3 . From the statistics, we can see that the NFSM approach is not a good fit for the passive testing of the behavior of OSPF. Passive testing algorithms using EEFSM model are much better than NFSM model. Algorithm 2 uses Interval to record the possible variable value regions and uses assertion to record the relations among variables. In this way it has a better knowledge of the running state machine compared to Algorithm 1. Obviously, Algorithm 2 is more powerful than Algorithm 1.
In the experiments, among the homing cases, Algorithm 2 takes an average of 4.4 steps to finish state homing, and takes an average of 11 steps to finish variable homing. The number of possible CCSs in Q1 never exceeds 10. This algorithm can detect faults in the OSPF neighbor state machine effectively.
Conclusion and future work
In a unit testing, a protocol system can be isolated and tested by actively applying inputs to reveal faults from the outputs in response. However, for a system in operation in a networked or integrated environment, often we could only passively observe the system behaviors to detect faults, and that naturally leads to the passive testing research and development activities.
In this paper, several passive testing algorithms on the EEFSM model and their applications to the OSPF neighbor state machines are presented. The deficiencies of existing algorithms are studied, and our algorithms prove to be much more effective in tracing the state and the variables values for detecting faults. We use symbolic logic methods to deal with the predicates and use assertions to record the relations among variables. The idea behind our approach is to refine the valid variable value sets using as much information as possible.
Fault location is an important step after fault detection so that detected faults can be identified and corrected. Yet little progress has been made.
